Impossible
totalizing of History
The
philosophers do not escape the temptation of the eternal return. Such
is their strong libido to embrace the worrying opening of historical
time while bringing it back to the reason of the construction of a
'system'. But the 'philosophies of History' which claim 'to
buckle' up the totality of History in the safety and the closing of a
system
always invariably failed.
Impossible
return in the eternal return… The nostalgia
to seek refuge in the centre of the loop may be huge, but that is
from now on impossible. You cannot return for a second time in the
maternal womb. Once contaminated by historical concern it is
impossible to get back any more the innocence of the eternal return.
The human condition is irremediably delivered to adventure and risk.
Nevertheless he can try to buckle 'virtually' the loop of his
comprehension. By building a philosophy
of History.
Every philosophy of History wants thus to bring back History in
the bosom of the reason. Their failure is however obvious. The reason
of History, indeed, is not in the reason but in the opening of
History which crucifies the reason.
We are irreversibly embarked. Our comprehension is it also irremediably
embarked. Not only history is in exodus but also the intelligibility
of history and its sense. Being in exodus without recourse, our
reason is inevitably tempted by the cycle. Philosophies of history
want to bring back history to reason. But the reason of history is not in the reason but in the history which crucifies the
reason.
Philosophies
of history are despaired efforts to knot again the wire which is
reeled out of our range. These efforts try to deny the abrupt opening
of the historical adventure without ever really succeeding. Unless
being satisfied with the appearance of a success which, actually, is
nothing else than a rationally disguised return in the cycle of the
eternal return, with the secret wish not to be embarked without
recourse but to master, at least intellectually, the situation.
A
philosophy of History is each time born from the concern of placing
the dubious adventure within a more rationally save-making framework.
It is a question of understanding the past; it is still more a
question of being located in the present; it is especially a question
of dealing with the surprises of the future. To embrace the unknown
brings intellectual satisfaction. It can defuse our existential
threats. It may also, alas, control and dominate the human
project.
One
starts by extrapolating
a
historical segment and
projecting
it in the future. These two moments raise from the start of
insurmountable difficulties. Is it possible to extrapolate and
project another thing that of a relative one? Which part for which
whole? Isn't this extrapolated portion of history ridiculously
disproportionate compared to the totality of History? When we say
history,
which is the 'thickness' of timing we are located in and speaking
about? The 'module' whose generalization and projection in the future
allows a philosophy of history, which scale is it to be determined
from? Is one century of material progress enough to justify its
continuation ad infinitum and to affirm that the whole history is
progress? What is a century, what are ten centuries, what are
thousand centuries in comparison with the total History?
What
do we know about historical times?
Is it homogeneous or heterogeneous? What is more relevant, the
continuous line or the ruptures? Where is the decisive one? Is it in
evolution or in revolutions? Which past? The past in its totality
escapes from us. It is never but one certain length more or less
elucidated according to the epistemological possibilities of the
present. Is only one certain reading always possible of one certain historical past. This past is revisable and, in fact, unceasingly re-examined. The model intended to be projected in
the future is thus always relative. Relative in its framing. Relative
in its contents. Relative in its form. To project this relative
design in the totality of the future can be only an extremely
hazardous undertaking. We can only project in the future
uncertainties of the present nourished of just some certainties of
the past.
And
which future? Only
now is
reality.
The past is
not any more.
The future is
not yet.
The possibilities about the past are very relative. As for the
future, it is mostly the domain of the impossible one, although it
interests us primarily. Projection is thus our only possibility face
to our impossibility on the future. What is worth such constructions starting from such projections? Can they be something
else than only ideal constructions, necessarily dependant on one a
priori
since the future escapes any possible experience? They are thus only
assumptions and as such subjected to the confirmation or the
invalidation a
posteriori
of a future once accomplished.
To
assign an 'end' to History, it would be necessary that one can
consider it starting from its term or from its fence. However we are
embarked in the middle of the
History. The question of the sense
of History is compromised with our adventure. It is heavy weight of
the human decision through uncertainty and risk. The sense of History
is in exodus. The sense of History is readable neither in the events
themselves nor in their empirical unfolding. The sense of History can
only transcend phenomenal events. It is not in
the
events, it crosses
them. It comes from the other
dimension of History, namely of its trans-historic
verticality.
Hermeneutic
circle.
The intelligibility of one time of history implies the
intelligibility of the whole history… which is not possible but
from one moment of history. The comprehension of the
present determines the comprehension of the past. There is thus a
past only according to a present. In addition the comprehension of
the past determines the comprehension of the present. There is thus a
present only according to a past. The intelligence is caught in the
wheel of the hermeneutic circle. Historical intelligibility is
condemned to turn around the subject-object ratio of
history. Because man is both at the same time, historical object and
historical subject. Consequently the object cannot be something else
than the adventure of the subject himself, and the subject cannot be
something else than the self-comprehension of the object which he is
himself. Man, finally, has to value. Our judgements on history are
inevitably also value judgements. But aren't the criteria of these
values largely the fruit of history?
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